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Introduction
There is no consensus amongst 
policy makers and scholars about 
the role that ethical considerations 
should and will play in international 
climate change negotiations. In 
this article, I defend the role of 
ethics in these negotiations, both 
in the normative sense and in the 
descriptive sense.1 In doing so, I 
respond to a number of arguments 
which hold that ethical considerations 
either should not or will not play an 
important role in international climate 
change negotiations. First, I reply to 
claims that all ethical theories and 
positions are subjective and, as such, 
it is not wise to use them as a guide 
to shaping a new treaty. Second,  
I argue against claims that ethical 
considerations are not relevant in the international sphere. 
Third, I challenge the commonly held view that it is rarely 
in the interest of  countries to contribute their ethical share 
of  the effort to mitigate climate change. Fourth, turning to 
the descriptive question, I argue that ethical considerations 
already pervade international negotiations and suggest 
that they will continue to do so. I conclude that arguments 
against the use of  ethical considerations in relation to climate 
change are not convincing and that there are good reasons 
to believe that ethics should and will play a significant role 
in international climate change negotiations.
Is ethics subjective?
Some scholars argue that ethics is, by its very nature, 
subjective. Because of  this, some people believe that it 
is unsuitable for use in international negotiations. Their 
argument generally runs like this: (1) ethics is subjective; (2) 
it is not possible to resolve subjective matters through reason 
or observation; (3) because of  this, considering subjective 
matters may delay negotiations without producing any real 
progress; (4) it is of  great import that we come to quick 
agreement in the climate change negotiations; (5) therefore, 
it is undesirable to take into account ethical considerations 
when negotiating a new climate treaty. 
A number of  objections can be raised to this line of  
reasoning. The first is that it is not at all clear that ethics 
is subjective. In fact, a number of  philosophers have 
suggested that ethics is objective, and have proposed a range 
of  methods that might be used for settling moral disputes 
(e.g. Moore, 1903; McDowell, 1978; Railton, 1986; Sayre-
McCord, 1988; Smith, 1994). 
Even if  it is true that ethics is subjective and that ethical 
issues cannot be resolved through reason or observation, it 
remains the case that there is substantial agreement on a 
number of  ethical matters, particularly on the practical level. 
For example, there is much disagreement about what makes 
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murder wrong but there is almost universal agreement about 
the wrongness of  murder. Likewise, in the case of  climate 
change, the same ethical conclusions are reached again 
and again. On the theoretical level, equality, capability and 
historic responsibility consistently turn up in the literature 
as important factors in determining how much of  the effort 
of  mitigation particular countries should agree to take on.2 
Moreover, on a practical level, it is widely recognised3 – in 
fact, it is even imbedded in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – that developed 
countries have a responsibility to take the lead in dealing with 
climate change. Thus, while there is disagreement about the 
appropriate division of  the mitigation burden, this must be 
understood in the context of  significant moral consensus 
within the overall debate.
Returning to the original argument, it is not clear that 
ignoring ethical issues will reduce delay. While there is 
no straightforward method of  applying reason to ethical 
problems in order to come to an objective conclusion, there 
remain at least two methods to resolve moral disagreements. 
The first is to rely on intuition to guide us in identifying 
an ethical framework. The second is to use a range of  
moral theories to narrow down the list of  
justifiable principles that play a role in the 
climate change debate (see Kengmana and 
Boston (2008) for an application of  this 
method). This can significantly reduce the 
realm of  disagreement and minimise delay. 
Furthermore, as will be discussed below, 
it is not clear that trying to ignore ethical 
issues will successfully speed up the process, 
as those who feel they have justified moral grievances are not 
likely to be willing to ignore them.
Do we have ethical responsibilities to other nations?
Another objection that is sometimes raised against the use of  
ethics in climate change negotiations is that ethics cannot be 
applied at the international level. This argument differs from 
the previous argument in that it does not rest on a premise 
about the universal nature of  ethics but rather claims that 
the nature of  ethics rules it inapplicable on the international 
level. It holds that there are significant disanalogies between 
applying ethics to individuals and applying ethics to countries. 
So, they claim, countries do not have the same responsibilities 
to other countries as individuals have to other individuals. 
John Rawls (1993) supported this position. He suggested 
that although countries have an obligation to promote 
distributive justice for their citizens, these obligations do 
not extend beyond national borders. This asymmetry in the 
moral responsibility of  society is justified, in his view, because 
institutions are legitimised by a hypothetical social contract. 
While these contracts could clearly be formed on the national 
level, he argued, global contracts that guaranteed distributive 
justice would be highly controversial. Hence, he concluded, 
countries do not have an inherent responsibility to look after 
the well-being of  other citizens.
Michael Black (2001) offers a more contemporary 
defence of  this position. He argues that the implicit social 
contract between those who live in liberal nations includes 
a commitment on the part of  the state to preserve, wherever 
possible, the autonomy of  its citizens. While this agreement 
does not supersede the other duties a state has, it does imply 
that states should not compel their citizens to take actions 
unless those actions are necessary for a well functioning 
society. As such, it is perfectly consistent for countries to 
apply coercive force to ensure distributive justice within 
their own borders, as this is (arguably) a necessary part of  a 
well functioning society, without also promoting distributive 
justice internationally. While stopping short of  concluding 
that countries have no international obligations, he argues 
that countries, without the approval of  their citizens, are not 
justified in going any further than providing subsistence aid 
to other nations.
Many scholars regard the positions advanced by Rawls 
and Black as implausible. For example, Thomas Pogge 
(1989, 1992, 1994 and 2003) argues that the country where 
a person is born is determined solely by chance. Accordingly, 
it is similar to other arbitrary factors such as a person’s 
race and gender, and thus should not be used as a basis for 
discriminating between people. On this basis he concludes 
that it is more appropriate to form social contracts on an 
international level than on a national level. This implies that 
governments should consider global welfare rather than 
simply national self-interest in determining their course of  
action. As a result, according to Pogge, countries should take 
issues of  global justice into account when negotiating, or 
indeed taking, any action on the international level.
Even if  Pogge’s objections are not considered to be a 
decisive refutation of  Rawls’ and Black’s positions, there 
are two other reasons why their arguments do not apply 
in the case of  sharing the burden of  climate change. First, 
since climate change is a collective action problem, the 
only effective way it can be addressed is through global 
cooperation. Although robust institutions for global burden 
sharing do not exist yet, it is in our interests to build them. As 
such, it is in our interest to negotiate an international social 
contract, and such a contract must be based on equitable 
principles to garner large-scale acceptance.
Second, it is clear that the actions of  large emitters 
have harmed, and are continuing to harm, other countries. 
Therefore, developed countries have not only a distributive 
duty to take on greater costs than developing countries but 
also a moral debt for creating the problem that is adversely 
... since climate change is a collective problem, 
the only effective way it can be addressed is 
through global co-operation.
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affecting others. Accordingly, even if  considerations of  
distributive justice cannot play a role at the global level, in 
the case of  climate change there are serious questions of  
retributive and commutative justice that must be addressed. 
Is ethical action inconsistent with self-interested action?
Underlying the two objections presented above is the 
commonly held belief  that a country’s self-interest is at odds 
with its ethical responsibilities. If  this is not the case – i.e. 
if  there is no difference between the ethical action and the 
self-interested action – little rides on the question of  whether 
ethics should play a role in the climate change debate. 
In general, the belief  that ethical action is at odds with 
self-interested action stems from the fact that the negotiation 
problem is often framed as a simple prisoner’s dilemma. 
The argument assumes that countries are facing a choice 
between acting ethically (offering to take on stringent 
emission reduction targets) and acting selfishly (refusing to 
adopt targets). It is pointed out that since each country’s 
emissions are small relative to total global emissions, their 
efforts cannot unilaterally prevent dangerous climate change 
from occurring. Therefore, countries gain little from taking 
action but must take on real costs if  they choose to address 
climate change. 
This line of  reasoning leads to the conclusion that it is 
in a country’s self-interest to take as little action as possible. 
However, as Scott Barrett (1999) points out, this is a 
misleading way to construe the problem. It wrongly assumes 
that one country’s action does not influence other countries’ 
actions; that countries face two discrete strategies; and that 
there are only costs and no benefits from addressing climate 
change. Each of  these assumptions is incorrect and replacing 
them with more realistic assumptions can radically reshape 
the nature of  optimal action. 
The assumption that one country’s action cannot affect 
the actions of  other countries does not hold in the climate 
change debate. By taking actions, countries change the 
incentive structure other countries face. For simplicity, let us 
consider a two-country case in which Country A chooses to 
take action by limiting emissions. Before Country A’s action, 
Country B had the option of  unilaterally taking action but, if  
Country A did not follow, this would harm its high-emission 
industries, possibly forcing them offshore. This would impose 
significant short-term economic adjustment costs, as labour 
and capital moved to less emission-intensive industries, as 
well as significant political costs, as high-emission industries 
would be likely to resist this change. However, after Country 
A’s action, Country B’s costs of  action are drastically 
reduced. Although there are still some opportunity costs in 
taking action (e.g. Country A’s high-emission industries do 
not leak over to Country B), the adjustment costs disappear, 
since the high-emission industries already in Country B can 
no longer go to Country A to avoid internalising the cost of  
their emissions – and the political costs are much lower – 
since existing industries are not under threat. 
So, in economic terms, if  we were to represent this game 
as providing countries two discrete choices, it would be more 
accurate to represent it as the stag hunt game shown in 
Table 1 (where the number in the bottom left corner relates 
to Country A and the number in the top right corner relates 
to Country B) than as the prisoner’s dilemma shown in Table 
2. The difference is that in the prisoner’s dilemma, there is a 
single dominant strategy equilibrium in which both countries 
fail to act, while in the stag hunt game there are two Nash 
equilibria: either both countries fail to act or both countries 
act. Both countries wish to get to the second equilibrium but 
to do so one of  them must take costly unilateral action in the 
faith that the other will follow.
Table 1: The stag hunt 
Country B 
C
ou
nt
ry
 A
 
Table 2: The prisoner’s dilemma 
Country B 
C
ou
nt
ry
 A
 
 Act Fail to act 
Act                   4 
4 
               3 
0 
Fail to act                 0 
3 
               1  
1 
 Act Fail to act 
Act                   3 
3 
               5 
0 
Fail to act                 0 
5 
               1  
1 
Interpreting the international negotiations process this 
way gives us a much more accurate picture of  a country’s 
self-interest, but it remains an oversimplification because it 
only allows a binary choice: to act to mitigate climate change 
or to fail to mitigate climate change. In reality, countries can 
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environmental innovation, small countries may capture an emerging market 
for environmental goods which is small in absolute terms but may make a 
significant contribution to their economy as a whole.
Policy Quarterly – Volume 4, Issue 4 – November 2008 – Page 23
choose whether or not to take action as well as the level of  
effort in their emissions reduction. If, as most experts suggest 
(e.g. Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007), the cost of  rising temperature 
increases exponentially, then the first emissions removed 
from the atmosphere will reduce the most marginal harm, 
and if  the reduction policy is well designed the emissions 
that produce the least marginal benefit will be the first to go. 
This is significant because it strongly increases the likelihood 
that it will be in a country’s self-interest to mitigate climate 
change, since this will be the case whenever the marginal 
harm of  the last (and therefore the most expensive) unit of  
emission causes more harm than removing it through the 
cheapest method possible. 
Of  course, if  only a negligible part of  the harm from 
emissions is internalised, then it would still remain the case 
that reducing emissions will not be in a country’s self-interest. 
However, for large countries it is not the case that their 
emissions, as a percentage of  the global total, are negligible. 
As Figure 1 shows, at least three parties – the United States, 
China and the EU – each produce 15% or more of  global 
emissions. If  it is the case that the marginal harm caused 
by the current levels of  emissions is much larger than the 
marginal benefits that these emissions produce, as Nicholas 
Stern (2006) suggests, then it is in fact in these countries’ self-
interest to reduce some of  their emissions. So it is likely that 
the equilibrium result involves taking at least some action, 
and in the current circumstances it may even imply that it 
is in the interest of  large emitters to commit, unilaterally, to 
substantial action. 
It should also be noted that if  these commitments were to 
form the basis of  an international treaty, the self-interested 
level of  action taken is likely to increase even further 
since commitments by one party are likely to increase the 
commitments other parties are willing to make.
These facts notwithstanding, it does not make sense 
to reduce emissions if  these emissions are leaked to other 
countries. This simply moves the problem offshore while 
imposing a significant cost on local producers and reducing 
economic efficiency. Taking on stringent targets may cause 
this leakage to occur in two ways. It might directly cause high-
emission goods to leak to other countries with less stringent 
controls on emissions, or it might cause this to happen 
indirectly by reducing the incentive for other countries to 
take action (since the most harmful emissions are no longer 
in the atmosphere).  
Against this, there are some reasons to think that by 
undertaking mitigation, a country will encourage reciprocal 
behaviour. Again, this can be caused directly, through 
economic, diplomatic or consumer pressure on countries 
which do not reduce emissions, or indirectly, through a 
reduction in the cost competitiveness of  burden sharing.
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Figure 1: Annual carbon dioxide emissions as a proportion of global emissions, 2004
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For small countries, the incentives to mitigate climate 
change are different. They cannot unilaterally change the 
level of  harm they face from climate change since they 
cannot materially affect the global emission level. However, 
they face a range of  other incentives.
First, although economic sanctions have not at this point 
yet been used against countries which have not taken steps 
to address climate change, a number of  officials, such as 
European Commission president José Manuel Barroso 
(Harrabin, 2008), have signalled their use in the future. This 
presents a real risk to small economies, many of  which are 
highly reliant on international trade. 
As the ‘food miles’ incident potently illustrated,4 even if  
formal sanctions are not imposed, environmentally aware 
consumers may penalise goods produced in countries seen to 
be shirking their responsibilities to mitigate climate change.
Further, smaller countries also have the flexibility to profit 
from early mitigation by capturing niche markets, such as 
ecotourism and sustainable energy technology. Because of  
their size, it is likely that a limited number of  small countries 
will be able to profit by pursuing an aggressive climate change 
strategy. By implementing policy that promotes a nation’s 
environmental image or environmental innovation, small 
countries may capture an emerging market for environmental 
goods which is small in absolute terms but may make a 
significant contribution to their economy as a whole. 
Although it may not always be in a country’s interest to 
act ethically, ethical action is not dialectically opposed to self-
interested action. There are, in fact, many situations – e.g. in 
attempting to solve the collective action problem, or in trying 
to overcome political resistance – when it is in a country’s 
self-interest to explicitly act ethically.
Will ethics play a role in the negotiation process?
Even though there are compelling reasons to think that 
countries should act ethically, it is not clear that they will 
do this in practice. Instead, they may negotiate merely from 
their country’s perceived interests or in the interest of  their 
country’s current governing party. Although, as argued above, 
coming to an ethical agreement may be in most countries’ 
interest, the common perception is that it is in their interest 
to avoid actions. Therefore, if  a particular country were 
to attempt to negotiate an ethical outcome while all other 
countries negotiated solely from a position of  self-interest, it 
may well end up hurting its own citizens without materially 
affecting the overall equity of  the outcome. 
Bruce Burson (2008) identifies three reasons why ethics 
plays a role in climate change negotiations. Firstly, there are 
real moral concerns fundamental to the question of  burden 
sharing. Some countries and individuals are able to cut 
emissions at lower welfare costs than others. Some countries 
have played a much larger role in creating the problem than 
others. Therefore, a negotiation that fails to take into account 
these factors would be rejected by those who are morally 
entitled to a smaller burden.
Second, the principles of  common but differentiated 
responsibilities and of  equity are clearly embedded in the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (Rajamani, 
2006). Therefore, legally they must be taken 
into account. 
Thirdly, politically, if  the division of  the 
burden is perceived to be unjust then the 
outcome will not have the legitimacy necessary 
to be sustained over time. On the international 
level, a legitimacy deficit is likely to lead to 
costly renegotiations every time there is a 
change in the relative influence of  a major 
country (or block of  countries). On the national 
level, there will always be political pressure for 
policy makers to renege on a commitment that 
is perceived to impose an unfair burden on 
their nation. 
For these reasons, future negotiations will need to find 
a genuinely just solution (or something very close), even if  
countries are fundamentally motivated by self-interest.
Conclusion
The four questions explored in this article surrounding the 
use of  ethics in climate change illustrate the following: 
(1) that the fact that ethical considerations may be subjective 
does not constitute a reason to ignore ethics in negotiating 
a climate treaty; 
(2) that there is good reason to think that ethics is relevant to 
the relationships between nations; 
(3) that ethical and self-interested actions are often 
synonymous; and
(4) that for moral, legal and political reasons, ethics has played 
a part, and will continue to play a part, in international 
climate negotiations. 
While I have focused on defending the place of  ethics in 
international climate negotiations, I would like to conclude 
with some positive reasons for the inclusion of  ethics in these 
negotiations. First, moral causes can provide the necessary 
political will for difficult policy actions. Standing up to the 
United States on nuclear weapons was both economically 
and diplomatically costly for New Zealand. Yet public 
opinion in New Zealand was sufficiently strong that the 
real costs of  the action were deemed acceptable. Likewise, 
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... moral causes can provide the necessary 
political will for difficult policy actions. Standing 
up to the United States on nuclear weapons 
was costly ... for New Zealand, yet public 
opinion was sufficently strong that the real 
costs of action were deemed acceptable. 
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on the international level, taking an ethical perspective may 
potentially break deadlocks since it provides a perspective 
that every party can relate to. The fact that a certain action 
is good for Country A will provide little motivation for 
Country B to support the action unless it happens to be good 
for Country B. However, the fact that it is morally right can 
influence Country B to support it even if  it is not in Country 
B’s self-interest to do so. Accordingly, ethics must play an 
important role in climate negotiations if  we are to achieve a 
desirable post-2012 international agreement.
1 This article draws on an earlier paper prepared for the Post-2012 Burden Sharing 
symposium, 29 July 2008, Wellington, jointly hosted by the European Union Centres 
Network and the Institute of Policy Studies. It is available at http://ips.ac.nz/publications/
publications/show/34. The author would like to thank Jonathan Boston and Sebastian 
Henderson for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the article.
2 See, for example, Ott et al. (2004), Höhne et al. (2005), Rajamani (2006), Boston and 
Kengmana (2007) and Ott (2007).
3 See, for example, UNFCCC (1992), Singer (2002), Ott et al. (2004), Höhne et al. (2005), 
Rajamani (2006), Boston and Kengmana (2007) and Ott (2007).
4 The ‘food miles’ incident was caused by a British company urging its consumers to avoid 
New Zealand butter because of the emissions produced by freighting the butter all the way 
to England.
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